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Efficiency and Equity of Rural Land Markets and the Impact on Income: Evidence in 
Kenya and Uganda from 2003 to 2015  
Tabetando Raynera and Yoko Kijimab
Abstract 
This study examines the evolution and impact of land sales and rental markets on agricultural 
efficiency in rural Kenya and Uganda using panel data spanning over 10 years. We first analyse 
the efficiency gains induced by land sales and rental markets by estimating the impact of 
participation in markets on unobserved farmer ability and land endowment. We do find evidence 
in both countries, that land markets induce efficiency by transferring land to households with 
higher farming ability. In both countries, the land market enhances equity by transferring land 
from land-abundant to land-constrained households. Although renting-in land increases crop 
income in Kenya, we find no evidence that renting in land enables households to escape from 
poverty. In contrast, increase in land owned helped decrease poverty incidence in Uganda. These 
findings points to potential weaknesses in the functioning of land markets in Kenya and Uganda 
which impedes their ability to contribute to poverty alleviation.  
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Introduction
Rural households in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) essentially depend on land for their livelihood. 
However, land is becoming scarcer in several countries due to rapid population growth and 
stagnated agricultural productivity (World Bank 2008). Since the early 2000s, access to 
commercial agriculture has been increasing due to the supermarket revolution (Reardon et al. 
2003), this has increased the number of commercial opportunities available to farmers. The 
educated now have increasing opportunities to earn higher income from non-agricultural 
employment in urban cities, thus inducing rural–urban migration as a diversification strategy. In 
this regard, land markets can enhance the welfare of rural households by equalizing factor 
endowments and encouraging increased land productivity. Whether land markets contribute to 
increased agricultural productivity and household welfare, however, depends on how the land 
market works. Since the factor endowment and institutional framework is different across 
countries and changes over time, a need has arisen to accumulate more recent evidence to better 
understand the role of the land market and its implications for agricultural productivity, equity, 
and welfare of farm households in SSA.  
This study provides recent evidence on the evolution of land markets over a decade 
using panel data from two neighbouring SSA countries, namely, Uganda and Kenya.1 Although 
some studies have considered the land markets in Uganda and Kenya, no study has used panel 
household data spanning over a decade after the mid-2000s, when the food price, agricultural 
land demand for commercial purposes, and population growth rate have gone up significantly. As 
with the comprehensive analyses of six SSA countries carried out by Deininger et al. (2017) in 
2011, our comparison over time of two SSA countries gives us important insights on land policy.  
1 This study was supported by : Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (Overseas Academic Research) (JSPS 
KAKENHI Grant Number 15H02619) and the GRIPS Emerging State Project of the Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science (JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 25101002) 
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To understand who uses land markets, we examine the participation in both land sales 
and rental markets, and test whether these markets transfer land from less efficient but 
land-abundant to efficient but land-scarce households. The existing literature on land market 
participation in SSA tends to focus only on the land rental market (Jin and Jayne 2013, ; 
Chamberlin and Ricker-Gilbert 2016) because land sales transactions are not frequently observed 
after household formation.2 Since we have access to the long-term panel data of transactions in 
the land sales market after household formation, we test whether the land sales market improves 
efficiency and equity.  
This study also assesses the impact of land market participation on crop income, 
off-farm income, and household welfare. Most of the studies on SSA show that land market 
participation enhances efficiency and equity, but a few examine whether agricultural productivity 
improves with participation in the land market. Even when land is transferred to more efficient 
land-constrained households, the significance and magnitude of the impact remains an empirical 
question.3 Also, increased participation in the land market due to issuance of land certification 
can facilitate labour movement from agricultural to non-agricultural jobs (de Janvry et al. 2015; 
Deininger et al. 2014), resulting in higher off-farm income. Households obtaining more land 
through market transactions, therefore, may not increase their total household income if the 
decrease in off-farm income overweighs the increase in agricultural income.  
This study extends and compliments previous studies (Muraoka et al 2018; Chamberlin 
and Ricker-Gilbert 2016) which found that participation in land rental markets does not 
2 Exceptions are Deininger et al. (2017) and Deininger et al. (2009). The transactions in land sales market 
analysed in this study are different from land sales transactions at the time of family formation, which are 
examined in Ainembabazi and Angelsen (2016), Yamano et al. (2009), Wineman and Liverpool-Tasie (2017). 
3 There are studies such as Muraoka et al (2018) examining whether agricultural productivity is different in 
owned and rented in parcels. The results are mixed: some find that inputs applied and agricultural productivity 
in rented-in land is lower than those in owned parcels. In this study, we conduct analyses at household level 
since the decision of participating in land market and allocation of inputs in each parcel is made at household 
level to maximize the total production and profit.  
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necessarily lead to poverty alleviation. We shed light on potential factors impeding land markets 
from alleviating poverty. We show that selective migration and the distribution of land owned 
and farming ability may attenuate the impact of land market participation on poverty alleviation. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, in both Uganda and Kenya, the land rental 
market is instrumental in transferring land from households with lower agricultural ability to 
those with higher agricultural ability. With regards to land sales market, we find that land sales 
market induces the transfer of land from households with lower agricultural ability to households 
with higher agricultural ability in Uganda but not in Kenya. On a whole, we find evidence in 
both countries that land markets induce agricultural efficiency. In terms of equity i.e. the transfer 
of land from land abundant to land constrained households, we find that land rental markets 
induce equity in Kenya and Uganda. However, land sales market induces equity in Uganda, but 
not in Kenya.  In terms of welfare, in both Kenya and Uganda, an increase in the size of land 
rented-in enhances the value of crop production but does not enable households to escape from 
poverty.  
To shed light on the potential weaknesses in the functioning of land markets in Kenya 
and Uganda which impedes their ability to contribute to poverty alleviation, we relate land 
owned and agricultural ability to measures of migration. The result suggest that there is selective 
migration in both Uganda and Kenya. In Uganda, households with high farming ability are more 
likely to have adult household members who have migrated for job related purposes. In Kenya, 
farming ability negatively correlates with indicators of migration. If talented households turn to 
migrate in Uganda, this can potentially attenuate any efficiency gain induced by land market 
participation 
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 overviews the land markets in Uganda 
5 
and Kenya. Section 3 discusses the conceptual framework and empirical models related to land 
market participation. Section 4 describes the data used and descriptively explores the evolution 
of the land market. Section 5 gives the estimation results, and the last section concludes the 
paper. 
2. Land Tenure System and Land Markets in Uganda and Kenya 
Although the household and land size in Uganda and Kenya are similar, the land tenure systems 
and the informal land rental markets (borrowing) in the two countries are different. In this 
section, we provide the background of land tenure systems, land market development, and 
land-related policies in Uganda and Kenya. 
The customary tenure system is still common in Uganda. In this system, land is 
allocated by the chief or by land clearing, and inherited by descendants. These traditional tenure 
systems are both de facto and de jure at the origin of land endowments, with regional differences 
in factor endowments and land market development. In regions with a high population density, 
people commonly migrate to other regions in search of arable land, thus facilitating land 
transactions via land markets for several decades (Baland et al. 2007).  
Since the end of the 1990s, the land rental market in Uganda has been showing 
increasing participation. While 14% of households rented in land in 1999 (Deininger and Mpuga 
2009), 19% did so in 2010 (Deininger et al. 2017). Non-market land transfers (borrowing) offer 
an avenue for rural households to adjust their land size in Uganda, in addition to sales and rental 
market participation. In 1999, the households borrowing land accounted for 21%, which is higher 
than the percentage of households that rented in land (Deininger and Mpuga 2008). 
The ‘mailo’ tenure system is peculiar to Uganda. It was crafted under the Buganda 
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Agreement in 1900, dividing the land in central Uganda between the colonial and the major 
traditional authorities. This agreement resulted in considerable land concentration because the 
traditional authorities owned large blocks of land and therefore required tenant farmers, mostly 
migrants, to farm their land. Subsequent legislations and the increase in land titling gave the 
tenant farmers greater security and enabled mailo landlords to engage in land rentals and sales. In 
the 1980s, about 60% to 85% of mailo land was under a tenancy agreement (Kisamba-Mugerwa 
and Barros 1989). The Land Act of 1998 provided the long-term mailo tenants with the right to 
acquire freehold title, creating overlapping rights between the tenants and landlords. Although 
mailo tenants had strong rights over land and could transact land in the land market, there must 
have been differences in the functioning of the land rental markets across regions. According to 
Deininger and Mpuga (2009), only 1% of households in the Central region rented in land in 
1992; this is lower than the proportion of households renting-in land in the other regions. 
Kenya implemented land reforms relatively early following the Swynerton Plan of 1954. 
This land registration and titling programme focused on agricultural areas with high potential, 
enabling land-constrained productive farmers to access more land. In addition to the Swynerton 
Plan, Kenya implemented a land redistribution programme by allocating the land previously 
expropriated by white settlers to native Kenyan farmers. On the whole, the development of land 
markets in Kenya seemed to vary across regions. Pinckney and Kimuyu (1994) found very low 
participation in land sales markets in central Kenya even though most of the land had titles.  
With regard to the land rental market, as previous studies have suggested, participation 
doubled from 10% in the late 1990s to 22% in 2007 (Wangila 1999; Yamano et al. 2008). Since 
no studies have described the participation in land rental market in Kenya after 2007, we do not 
know whether this increasing trend continued after 2007. In terms of efficiency of the land rental 
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market, Muraoka et al. (2018) examined how well land rental markets allowed households to 
obtain land for cultivation, using 2007 cross-sectional data, to find that land rental markets did 
not allocate land optimally. Since Muraoka et al. (2018) did not control for farming ability and 
other unobserved household heterogeneity affecting the participation of land rental markets, its 
findings are not conclusive. Unlike in Uganda, land borrowing arrangements are rare or 
non-existent in Kenya. 
3. Conceptual and Empirical Framework 
Bliss and Stern (1982) conceptualized a model to measure the efficiency of land rental markets. 
In a household utility maximization framework, the household decision to participate (rent-in, 
rent-out, or autarky) in land rental markets depends on the desirable or optimal household farm 
size at given output and input prices (wage, land rental cost adjusted by transaction costs) and 
endowments (land, labour, and agricultural ability). Households adjust their farm size to the 
optimal level by renting in, renting out, or staying out of land rental markets. However, if 
transaction costs are high in land rental markets, the optimal and realized farm sizes will often be 
different. A household’s choice of an optimal farm land depends on its endowment of 
non-tradable assets such as agricultural ability.  
From the above framework, a farmer will select a rent-in regime (rent-out) if the 
marginal product from farming an additional unit of land evaluated at his endowment level is 
greater (less) than the rental payment plus (minus) the associated transaction costs. Finally, a 
farmer will choose the autarky regime if the marginal product from farming an additional unit of 
land evaluated at his endowment level is less than the rental income he will receive as a landlord 
and greater than the rental fee he pays as tenant. 
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In practice, the outcome of participating in land markets may be different from 
theoretical predictions. In case of missing or imperfect credit markets, the access to land through 
land markets will depend on the households’ agricultural ability and, most importantly, their land 
and wealth endowments. Consequently, resource-poor households with high agricultural ability 
may be excluded from the land market (Deininger and Jin 2008).  
In the land sales market, a household maximizes its utility over the lifetime horizon by 
deciding on how much to consume, save, or invest in land to increase its land holdings. Land 
purchased in time t increases the household income in the following periods. Thus, endowments 
and agricultural ability as well as time preferences and credit constraints determine whether 
households purchase land or not. In addition, in case of no credit or insurance markets, the land 
market can induce land concentration through distress sales. The disposal of land through sales 
or rental markets can be the only available mechanism for poor households to cope with a 
negative shock (Carter and Barret 2006). 
From the conceptual model, household agricultural ability is a key variable of interest in 
the land rental participation decision. Therefore, we first need to estimate the household’s 
agricultural ability. Following Lanjouw (1999) and Jin and Deininger (2009), the household’s 
agricultural ability can be estimated as the time-invariant (fixed effect) parameter in the 
household panel crop production function. A Cobb–Douglas production function for household i
in village j at time t is specified in logarithmic form as (1)          +  +  +  +  +  ×  +  ,  
where , , and  are respectively the value of agricultural output, total farm land, and 
agricultural inputs (such as chemical fertilizer and improved seeds);  is a vector of other 
household characteristics such as the heads’ gender, age, and years of schooling as well as the 
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value of household agricultural assets and total asset holding;  is a vector of village-level 
controls such as distance to markets and district town and cumulative rainfall; and ×   is a 
vector of village by time dummies capturing the village system-wide productivity changes over 
time. Equation (1) is estimated using the household fixed effects model. Household agricultural 
ability ( ) is recovered as the unexplained household-specific time-invariant contribution to 
crop production. Though we generate household agricultural ability using an established 
methodology in the literature, we recognize that our measure of household agricultural ability 
may encompass any other household time invariant attribute that affects land productivity.  
Participation in land market is estimated using the following model: (2) +  +  +  +  +  +  ,
where  is a continuous measure of the size of land rented in at time t or land purchased 
between time t and t + 1, and the main variable of interest in this estimation.  is the 
landholding, and is the household fixed effects. Land rental markets induce efficiency in crop 
production by enabling households with higher farming ability ( ) to access an optimal 
amount of farm land. Consequently, the sign of the coefficient on parameter  in the land 
rental equation ( ) is of primary interest in this study. While we are more interested in the sign 
than magnitude of the coefficient on , the coefficient on  is likely to be biased downward. 
Several studies have found the plots offered for rent to be of lower soil fertility compared to 
own-cultivated plots (Benin et al. 2006; Yamano et al. 2009).4 However, since the impact of 
rented-in land on household welfare is estimated via the household fixed effects, and assuming 
that soil quality does not change much over a short period of time, the possibility of downward 
bias should not be of much concern. The coefficient on landholding ( ) indicates the extent to 
4 Yamano et al. (2009) used the first round (2004) of the data used in this study for the analysis in Kenya.  
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which pre-rental (pre-purchased) land holdings determine the land rental (sales) market 
participation decision. Following Skoufias (1995), the coefficient of +1 for the land rented-out or 
-1 for land rented in would indicate a fully efficient land rental market.  
To minimize the omitted variable bias in estimating the rental market participation 
decision in equation (2), we follow Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984), and add the 
household-level time averages of all time-varying variables in the model. These time averages 
are called the Mundlak-Chamberlain (MC) device. This is done assuming that the unobserved 
time-invariant household-level factors are correlated with the household-level time-constant 
averages (Wooldridge 2010; Chamberlin and Ricker-Gilbert 2016).  
For assessing the impact of rental participation on welfare, we first estimate the 
household fixed effect models. The net rented-in land is the main variable of interest. The 
outcome variables of interest are the real per capita household income, real per capita crop 
income, real per capita off-farm income, and poverty status.5 The regression equation is 
specified as follows: (3) +  +  +  +  +  +  ,  
where  is alternately the real per capita income, per capita crop income, and per capita 
off-farm income of household i in village j at time t.  is a continuous measure of the net land 
rented in at t or land purchased between t-1 and t, and the main variable of interest in this 
estimation.  is the household fixed effect encompassing the household-level time-invariant 
factors such as farming ability. 
5 Off-farm income is sum of agricultural wage, non-agricultural wage and salary, and non-farm self-employed 
income. Total household income consists of crop income, off-farm income, livestock income, and non-labour 
income. Poverty status is an indicator variable taking one if per capita income is less than poverty line. The 
national rural poverty line in Kenya was Ksh 1490/Month/Person in 2004 (Suri et al. 2008). We adjust 2012 
incomes to 2004 price level. In Uganda, we adjust all income and expenditure values to 2005 price level and 
used the 2005 poverty line (USD 166) as reported in Kijima et al. (2006). 
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By estimating equation (3) using household fixed effects, we control for the 
time-invariant unobserved confounders, which are likely to be correlated with the rental 
participation decision and household income. Farming ability is observed as a generated variable 
correlated with land market participation, but time-demeaning makes its inclusion in equation (3) 
redundant. Arguably, soil fertility might be correlated with land market participation decisions 
(Benin et al. 2006; Yamano et al. 2009), but considering the long panel (2003-2015 for Uganda 
and 2004-2012 for Kenya) data used in this study, changes in soil quality cannot be ruled out. 
Similarly, other unobserved factors such as risk and time preferences, managerial skills, and land 
management practices may bias the estimate of land market participation on household income. 
Note that village-wide changes are controlled for by including village-level controls and year 
dummies. A binary indicator of adult death in the household during the previous two years is also 
included.  
Jin and Jayne (2013) used a dynamic panel data approach along with the 
time-differencing operator and lag values as instruments for current values. We do not use this 
approach for at least two reasons. First, Uganda has sufficient lags (five rounds of survey data), 
but Kenya does not have sufficient lags (three rounds of survey data) to implement this strategy. 
Also, the lag values serving as instruments are likely to be weakly correlated with the current 
values if the time between the survey rounds is relatively long. On the whole, households do not 
randomly choose to rent in or rent out land, and since this study uses observational data, we 
interpret the estimated impact of land market participation cautiously. 
4. Data Source and Descriptive Statistics 
This study uses household and community-level data collated for Kenya and Uganda as part of 
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the longitudinal rural household panel survey project called Research on Poverty, Environment, 
and Agricultural Technology (RePEAT).6 The survey instruments considered for both countries 
are very similar. Data collection in Kenya was carried out in 2004, 2007, and 2012, while that in 
Uganda was conducted in 2003, 2005, 2009, 2012, and 2015. The baseline survey conducted for 
Uganda in 2003 covered 94 local council 1 (LC1s), the lowest administrative unit), randomly 
sampling 10 households from each LC1.7 The 2005, 2009, 2012, and 2015 survey rounds 
successfully captured data from 892, 816, 779, and 767 of the original households, respectively. 
On the whole, 647 households were surveyed in all the survey rounds. The overall attrition rate 
for Uganda was 30%. A total of 899 households were randomly sampled for Kenya from 99 
sub-locations (the lowest administrative unit at the time of the survey) in the first round in 2004, 
out of which 718 were surveyed in the second round in 2007 and 751 in 2012. We constructed a 
balanced panel data of 629 agricultural households for Kenya by including those who were 
interviewed in all the three survey rounds.8 The attrition rate for Kenya was 16%.9
Table 1 presents the changes in land holdings and the key land market features in 
Uganda and Kenya. The size of land owned and accessed (owned plus rented in/borrowed) in 
Uganda is slightly greater than that in Kenya (2.2 and 2.7 hectares in Uganda and 1.7 and 1.8 
hectares in Kenya, respectively). Since the number of family members is almost the same in 
these countries, the land owned per capita in Kenya is smaller than that in Uganda (0.25 and 0.30, 
respectively). The size of land owned has decreased slightly in both countries. In Uganda, the 
share of land acquired through the sales market increased marginally from 46% in 2003 to 47% 
6 Details of the sampling procedure are provided in Kijima et al. (2006). 
7 LC1 is the smallest administrative unit in Uganda 
8 The 2007 survey initially targeted 774 households but due to budget constraints, households in 23 
sub-locations in Eastern province were dropped. The attrition rate between the first and second round is 7%. 
Attrition between the first (2004) and last round (2012) is 16% 
9 Since we find that attrition was not random, all the models are estimated with the inverse probability weight 
of attrition (IPW).  
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in 2015, whereas the land obtained through inheritance and gift declined slightly, indicating a 
shift from the traditional to market-based land allocation mechanism. In Kenya, the share of 
purchased land in owned land has remained stable at approximately 30%. As explained earlier, 
there is significant difference between these countries in formality of the land owned: while more 
than 80% of the households in Kenya own land certificates, less than 10% of the households in 
Uganda own land certificates. This situation has not changed over the last 10 years.  
As regards land transactions during the last 12 months, about 20% of households in both 
countries rented in land, while only 1% of households in Kenya and 5% of households in Uganda 
purchased land. While 16% of households in Uganda borrowed land in 2003 without paying 
rents in order to adjust their land holdings, this trend declined over time as land became scarcer. 
As regards the land transactions between the survey rounds (in 3 to 5 years), less than  10% of 
households in both countries purchased land, while about 3% of households in Uganda and 1% 
of households in Kenya sold land. Although land sales market is an important mechanism to 
adjust the operational size of cultivated land, in both countries land sales market are still trivial 
albeit a relatively active sales market in Uganda compared to Kenya.  
Table 2 stratifies our sample by land rental market participation, showing the 
characteristics of the households participating in different land rental regimes. In both Uganda 
and Kenya, land-abundant households actively rented out land, while land-constrained 
households actively rented in land. In both countries, households that rented in land showed 
larger family sizes than those that rented out land. On the whole, land-abundant households in 
both Uganda and Kenya tended to rent out excess land to land-constrained but labour-endowed 
households.10
10 In this study we use the OECD equivalence scale to obtain an adult equivalence of household size. We 
assign a value of 1 to each adult, 0.5 to each child and 0.5 to each old person (age above 65). 
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In Kenya, households renting in land were better off (measured by income, asset, and 
poverty status) than those who rented out land or did not participate in land rental markets. 
Although in Uganda households who rented out land were better off than those who rented in 
land in 2005, by 2015 households who rented in land were better off compared to those who 
rented out land. In terms of migration, land abundant households in Uganda .i.e. households 
which borrowed-out land are more likely to have an adult household member who is a migrant 
worker while in Kenya, land constrained households .i.e. households which rented-in land are 
more likely to have an adult household member who is a migrant worker11. These differences in 
migration patterns may be driven by differences in the level of development of off farm 
opportunities and local labour markets. No major differences were found in other household 
characteristics such as household head’s gender, age, and education level between groups 
stratified by land rental market participation. 
Agricultural production, input use, agro-ecological condition, and market access are 
shown in the first two columns of table 3, where the application of inorganic fertilizer is only 2.6 
kg in Uganda but close to 30 kg in Kenya. Organic fertilizer is used more in both countries. 
While the majority of Kenyan households used improved seeds, only about half of the 
households in Uganda used improved seeds. Ugandan households have better agro-ecological 
conditions (annual rainfall 1165 mm vs. 630 mm) and access to markets (6 km vs. 9 km) than 
Kenyan households. 
5. Econometric Results  
In this section, we discuss the results of the Cobb–Douglas production function estimation, rental 
11 A migrant worker is an adult household member who has spent at least six months away from home for job 
related reasons. 
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and sales market participation, and impact of rental market participation on welfare. We discuss 
the results for Kenya and Uganda jointly.  
5.1 Production Function 
The descriptive statistics and estimation results of equation (1) for Kenya and Uganda are 
presented in table 3. While fertilizer application, household asset, size of cultivated land, and 
adoption of improved maize seeds correlate positively with agricultural production in Uganda, 
fertilizer application, household size, improved maize seeds, and size of cultivated land are key 
determinants of agricultural production in Kenya. From these estimations, we generate 
household farming ability as the unexplained time-invariant dimension of crop production. 
Figure 1 plots the farming ability and size of owned land in the first round of the survey. While 
there could be a clearer positive correlation between farming ability and land size in Kenya, no 
such correlation exists in Uganda, suggesting that participation in the land market can have 
different implications for household welfare in Kenya and Uganda.  
5.2 Land Rental Market Participation 
The estimation results of equation (2) for Uganda and Kenya are presented in table 4. Tobit 
model is combined with the MC device. Household farming ability increases the size of rented-in 
land in both Uganda and Kenya. While land borrowing provides an additional avenue for 
households to adjust their land holding in Uganda, borrowed land also increased with farming 
ability. This implies that land rental markets (both formal and informal) provide a platform for 
talented households to access the desired amount of farm land. This is in consonance with the 
efficiency argument that land markets induce efficiency by transferring land from less able to 
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more able producers. This finding is in line with previous studies such as Chamberlin and 
Ricker-Gilbert (2016), Deininger and Mpuga (2009), and Jin and Deininger (2009). For Kenya, 
Jin and Jayne (2013) found that households with higher farming ability are more likely to rent in 
than rent out land.  
A key relationship of interest is how the amount of land owned affects land market 
participation, because the land rental market can worsen inequality if land-scarce households rent 
out land to land-abundant households. From our results, households with smaller owned land 
tend to rent in land in both Uganda and Kenya. Interestingly, informal land markets i.e. land 
borrowing provides an additional mechanism for the equitable redistribution of land in Uganda. 
On a whole, this finding is in-line with the argument that land markets enhance equity in land 
redistribution by enabling more endowed households to transfer land to less endowed households. 
The coefficients on land endowment (-0.09 and -0.03 in the rent-in equation for Kenya and 
Uganda, respectively) indicate higher adjustment of the land-to-labour ratios through rental 
markets in Kenya than in Uganda. As regards the impact of household labour endowment on land 
market participation, we observe a positive correlation in both countries albeit not statistically 
significant in Kenya. On whole, the results suggest that households with more family labour in 
both countries are more likely to rent in land.  
As regards regions (provinces), the land rental market seems to be more active in the 
Eastern and Western regions of Uganda, where the customary tenure system is common, 
compared to the Central region, where the mailo tenure system is prevalent. Although the 
Ugandan government attempted to increase the tenure security of mailo tenants, the land rental 
market seems to function less, probably because of its overlapping ownership on mailo land. In 
Kenya, land rental markets seem to be more active in the Rift valley than in other provinces. This 
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regional difference may reflect the land distribution in Kenya since the Rift valley province has a 
few large land owners and smallholder families who migrated for agricultural work in the past. 
These results for Uganda suggest that the practice of borrowing land was less common in 2015 
compared to in 2005. 
On the whole, these results support the argument that land markets induce efficiency by 
transferring land from less efficient to more efficient households. There is also evidence in 
support of the equity argument stipulating that land markets enhance equity in land redistribution 
by enabling more endowed households to transfer land to less endowed ones. 
5.3 Participation in Land Sales Market 
The factors associated with land purchase and sales from 2003 to 2015 in Uganda and from 2004 
to 2012 in Kenya are presented in table 5. Land abundant households in Uganda seem to be more 
likely to sell land. However, in Kenya, households’ ownership of land has no effect on how 
many hectares of land are purchased or sold. These results are in-line with the descriptive 
statistics presented in table 1 showing that land sales market is more active in Uganda compared 
to Kenya.   
With regards to the efficiency of land sales market, household farming ability is 
significantly correlated with land purchase in Uganda suggesting that talented households adjust 
the operational size of their farms through land sales market. In Kenya, we do not find any 
significant relationship between farming ability and participation in land sales market. Land 
rental markets are more important than the sales market for enhancing efficiency in the short run. 
The land sales market can induce land concentration through distress sales of poor 
land-constrained households, but we find no evidence that the land sales market induces land 
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concentration in either Uganda or Kenya. 
5.4 Land Market Participation and Welfare 
The estimation results of equation (3) are presented in table 6. In both Kenya and Uganda, the 
net rented in land is positively correlated with the value of crop production and crop income. The 
association between renting-in land and value of crop production is as expected, because renting 
in land increases the scale of farming and thus production12.  
We further examine the possibility of renting in land crowding out the effect of off-farm 
income. In both Kenya and Uganda, the net land rented in is negatively associated with off-farm 
income suggesting that land rental markets may preclude households in both countries from 
participating in off-farm activities. This could be why renting in land does not significantly 
increase the total household income in neither Kenya nor Uganda. 
The results relating land market participation to household poverty status are presented 
in the last column of table 6. We do not find evidence that the amount of land rented in decreases 
the likelihood of being poor in either Uganda or Kenya. Informal land markets i.e. land 
borrowing does not reduce the likelihood of poverty in Uganda. Unlike Kenya, own land holding 
significantly reduces the likelihood of being poor in Uganda. This finding is consistent with Jin 
and Jayne (2013), who found that rental market participation in Kenya induces crop and 
household income, but has no impact on poverty reduction. Chamberlin and Ricker-Gilbert 
(2016) found similar results for Zambia. Transaction costs may also attenuate the impact of land 
markets by precluding certain households from participating in land markets. Chamberlin and 
Ricker-Gilbert (2018) show that high transaction costs preclude youths from participating in land 
markets in Tanzania. 
12 Given that very few households participate in land sales market, we drop land sales market participation 
from the welfare analysis. 
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We examine the differential effect of land markets on poverty status in Uganda and 
Kenya from the relationship between land holdings and farming ability under non-parametric 
regression. Figure 1 shows a positive correlation between land holdings and farming ability in 
Kenya, but no relationship in Uganda. Thus, the shifting of land from land-abundant to 
land-scarce households in Kenya can decrease efficiency. In addition, although land rented in can 
increase crop income, the marginal effect can be smaller for the poor13. The skewed distribution 
of returns on land rental market participation has been observed in other studies. For example, 
Chamberlin and Ricker-Gilbert (2016) found that renting in land in Malawi induced positive 
returns for wealthier/large-scale farmers, while poor/small-scale farmers suffered economic 
losses. table 3 (appendix) sheds more light on the reasons why land markets may not induce 
poverty reduction. The result seems to suggest that there is selective migration in both Uganda 
and Kenya. In Uganda, households with high farming ability are more likely to have adult 
household members who have migrated for job related purposes. In Kenya, farming ability 
negatively correlates with indicators of migration. If talented households tend to migrate in 
Uganda, this can potentially attenuate any efficiency gain induced by land market participation. 
6. Conclusion 
This study examines the factors related to rural households’ decision to participate in land rental 
and sales markets and its impact on agricultural production and welfare. We examine Kenya and 
Uganda for a period spanning more than 10 years. The two neighbouring East African countries 
present interesting similarities and contrasts that certainly impact the development of their land 
markets and the potential benefits from land market participation. We find the land rental and 
13 Results of quintile regression show that the benefit of participating in land rental markets are very small for 
poor/small scale farm households compared to relatively wealthy/large scale farm households   
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sales market participation of both countries to be similar, at about 20% and 5% of rural 
household participation, respectively. Less than 10% of households in Uganda still depend on the 
traditional land transaction mode, borrowing. The land rental and sales markets in the two 
countries, however, perform differently in many ways. 
The land rental markets in Uganda and Kenya are efficient in that they transfer land 
from households with lower farming ability to those with higher farming ability. This supports 
the argument that land markets induce agricultural efficiency. In terms of equity, land sales and 
formal and informal land rental markets (borrowing) in Uganda transfer land from land-abundant 
to land-constrained labour endowed households. However, in Kenya, only the land rental market 
transfers land from land-abundant to land-constrained labour endowed households. While the 
transactions in the land rental markets of both countries adjust their land-to-labour ratio only 
partially, the magnitude of the adjustment is higher in Kenya than in Uganda.  
In both Uganda and Kenya, renting-in land enhances household welfare. While renting 
in land increases crop income in Kenya, we find no evidence that it enables households to escape 
from poverty. Our results suggest that renting in land may decrease off-farm income thereby 
attenuating the positive impact of land rented-in on household income. In addition, Muraoka et al 
(2018) found that the adoption of modern production technologies is significantly lower on 
rented-in plots compared to own plots thereby leading to negligible net benefit from renting in 
land in Kenya. It Thus seem that the increase in crop income in absolute terms due to the land 
rental markets is not large enough to significantly change poverty status in either Kenya or 
Uganda. 
Though over 80% of households in Kenya have land certificates, the proportion of 
households participating in land markets is similar to that of Uganda where less than 10% of 
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households have land certificates. From this study, the benefits of land market participation 
cannot be fully harnessed by only strengthening and clarifying land rights. The distribution of 
farming ability and land owned as well as their correlation seems to affect the demand for and 
supply of land and poverty reduction. 
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Figure 1: Farming Ability and Land Holdings 
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                                  Table 1: Summary Statistics(Whole sample) 
Uganda Kenya 
2003 2005 2009 2012 2015 2004 2007 2012 
Household Size 7.19 7.57 7.37 7.24 6.55 6.89 7.70 7.96 
Size of Land Accessed(Hectares) 2.71 3.03 2.81 2.74 3.16 1.86 1.82 1.74 
Size of land Owned(Hectares) 2.20 2.42 2.16 1.45 2.38 1.76 1.70 1.63 
Share of HHs with any land certificate 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.83 na 0.86 
Share of HHs with at least one purchased plot 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.68 0.61 0.34 0.32 0.34 
Share of area inherited out of owned land 0.53     0.08 0.04* 0.42 0.51 0.66 0.68 0.66 
Share of area purchased out of owned land 0.46     0.57 0.36 0.56 0.47 0.31 0.30 0.31 
Last 12 months 
  Share of HHs who Rented In land na 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.16 
  Share of HHs who Rented Out Land na 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.09 
  Share of HHs who Borrowed In Land na 0.16 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  Share of HHs who Borrowed Out Land na 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 na na Na 
Share of HHs who Rented-In & Out land na 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Share of HHs who Purchased Land 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Between survey rounds 
Share of HHs who purchased land 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Share of HHs who sold land 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.01 
Number of Households 940 831 909 896 1378 899 714 751 
1) Authors computation from RePEAT surveys in Uganda and Kenya 
* The mode of land acquisition was not elicited in the 2005 and 2009 surveys. These statistics are dodgy since they are extrapolated 
from the 2005 and 2012. We should probably not report them.
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                            Table 2: Households Characteristics by land Market Participation 
Panel A: Uganda 2005 2015 
Rented 
In  
Rented 
Out  
Borrowed 
In 
Borrowed 
Out Autarky 
Rented 
In  
Rented 
Out  
Borrowed 
In 
Borrowed 
Out Autarky 
Size of Land Owned(Hectares) 1.25 2.97 0.71 3.19 2.73 1.36 3.16 0.53 3.42 2.53 
Area under cultivation (Ha) 1.35 1.51 1.12 1.51 1.32 2.08 2.97 1.22 3.45 2.03 
Per Capita Income(USD) 226.51 288.93 220.48 164.55 205.93 254.58 208.46 206.02 233.11 169.05 
Value of All Assets(USD) 177.24 226.07 187.99 255.44 212.11 145.66 152.34 209.25 421.18 173.36.84 
Proportion of Poor Households 0.49 0.46 0.55 0.35 0.51 0.36 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.31 
1 if Male Headed household 0.92 0.83 0.77 0.80 0.85 0.84 0.84 0.71 0.76 0.78 
Head’s years of schooling 6.25 6.02 5.9 6.36 6.44 5.45 6.25 4.5 5.67 5.28 
Age in years of Household 
Head 41.77 51.86 39.79 59.80.74 48.26 57.15 51.74 41.87 54.25. 54.58 
Household Size 7.71 7.21 6.37 9.50 7.61 6.66 7.26 6.71 8.57 6.43 
1 if Migrant household 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.28 0.17 0.39 0.4 0.36 0.46 0.45 
Adult Equivalent 4.79 4.79 3.78 6.10 4.86 5.03 4.47 4.23 6.21 4.16 
Number of Households 105 22 26 5 484   93 56 9 9 498 
Note: Migrant household takes the value 1 if an adult household member has spent at least six months away from home for job related purposes 
Panel B: Kenya 2007 2012 
Rented In 
Only 
Rented Out 
Only Autarky 
Rented In 
Only 
Rented Out 
Only Autarky 
Size of Land Owned(Hectares) 1.08 4.57 1.6 1.79 3.43 1.54 
Area under cultivation (Ha) 1.51 1.31 1.15 1.48 1.29 1.12 
Per Capita Income(USD) 265.48 218.83 245.91 493.35 428.98 419.24 
Value Of All Assets(USD) 582.37 623.58 511.63 1506.64 976.52 1255.59 
Proportion of poor Households  0.56 0.71 0.65 0.34 0.54 0.45 
1 if Male Headed household 0.8 0.67 0.71 0.8 0.71 0.70 
Head’s years of Schooling  7.94 5.38 7.33 10.32 6.33 8.11 
Age in years of Household Head 54.88 59.4 58.01 57.74 61.61 60.60 
1 if Migrant household 0.34 0.24 0.36 0.4 0.24 0.35 
Household Size 8.18 7.37 7.59 8.14 7.91 7.93 
Adult Equivalent 5.92 5.37 5.54 6.54 5.96 6.20 
Number of Households 153 52 508   112 67 572 
1)Authors computation from RePEAT; 2) Monetary values have been adjusted for inflation 
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Table 3: Crop Production Function 
Uganda Kenya Uganda Kenya 
Per capita value of agricultural output 116.5 150 
 (USD) 301 695 
Heads years of schooling 5.8 7.2 0.002 0.011 
3.7 6.9 (0.011) (0.016) 
Heads age in years  50 57 -0.002 0.007 
14.7 13.8 (0.005) (0.015) 
1 if Head is male 0.88 0.75 -0.146 0.199 
0.37 0.43 (0.202) (0.392) 
Adult equivalent 4.6 5.7 0.025 0.058 
2.46 2.6 (0.017) (0.083) 
Inorganic fertilizer application in Kg 2.6 27.4 0.062*** 0.223** 
13.9 38.1 (0.017) (0.103) 
Organic fertilizer application in Kg 68 212 0.021* 0.034 
409 808 (0.012) (0.071) 
1 if used improved seeds 0.57 0.83 0.509*** 0.623* 
0.49 0.37 (0.158) (0.32) 
Log value of total assets 233 930 0.199*** 0.231 
89 3,653 (0.046) (0.145) 
Log of cultivated land  2.26 1.41 0.540*** 1.108*** 
3.5 1.38 (0.066) (0.343) 
1 if own any land document 0.07 0.84 -0.025 0.358 
0.26 0.36 (0.094) (0.593) 
Log  of Rain fall(5 year average) 1,160 635 -0.251*** 0.271 
1,201 777 (0.027) (1.04) 
Log of distance in Km to district town 23.2 22.3 0.06 0.041 
30 31 (0.058) (0.212) 
Log of distance in Km to nearest market 5.6 8.66 -0.066 0.041 
7 5.6 (0.043) (0.384) 
Constant 11.949*** 1.861 
(0.335) (7.288) 
Observations 3,216 1,884 3,216 1,885 
R-squared 0.677 0.643 
District Specific Time Trend FE     YES YES 
Note: Results from Household fixed effect estimation. SEs are robust to clustering at community level.  
*p<0.10, **p<0.05 and ***p<0.01. Summary statistics are in level form 
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Table 4: Determinants of Land Market Participation(Tobit estimation) 
  Uganda Kenya 
  Net rented in (ha) Net borrowed in (ha) Net Land rented In (ha) 
Farming Ability 0.021*** 0.005 0.063*** 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.021) 
Log of land owned -0.037** -0.043*** -0.094** 
(0.016) (0.01) (0.038) 
Household size 0.009** 0.001 0.005 
(adult equivalent scale) (0.04) (0.001) (0.007) 
Regions 
East 0.119*** -0.009 
(0.029) (0.02) 
West 0.156*** -0.010 -0.187** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.066) 
Central -0.084* 
(0.035) 
Nyanza -0.139* 
(0.067) 
Survey year 
2009 0.077* -0.066*** 
(0.03) (0.01) 
2012 0.079* -0.004 0.028 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.022) 
2015 0.057 -0.045*** 
(0.04) (0.01) 
         Observations 2,588 2,588 1,258 
Note: Average marginal effects shown in table. Estimation employs the Mundlak Chamberlin device 
which entails including time averages of all time varying covariates (not shown). Additional controls 
include house head’s age, years of schooling, and gender, Total value of assets, indicator of adult dead 
within 2 years of survey, indicator of land document ownership, log of distance in km from each 
community to the nearest market and nearest district town, community level 5 year cumulative average of 
rainfall. Reference region for Uganda is Central while Rift Valley is the reference for Kenya. Reference 
year for Uganda is 2005 while it is 2007 for Kenya. Region and year interactions are also included. 
Clustered robust standard errors shown in parenthesis are bootstrapped at 250 replications to account for 
the generated regressor (farming ability).*p<0.10.**p<0.05. and ***p<0.01. 2003 and 2004 surveys for 
Uganda and Kenya respectively are not used in the estimation. 
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Table 5: Determinants of Land Market Transaction(Tobit estimation)  
Uganda Kenya 
Land 
Purchase(ha) 
between 
surveys (t and 
t+1) 
Land 
Sold(ha) 
between 
survey 
Land 
Purchase(ha) 
between 
surveys (t and 
t+1) 
Land Sold(ha) between 
survey 
Farming Ability 0.015** 0.020** -0.003 0.004
(0.006) (0.01) (0.014) (0.024)
Log of land owned -0.049** 0.023 -0.044 0.031
(0.02) (0.018) (0.045) (0.068)
Household size 0.000 0.003 -0.000 -0.001 
(adult equivalent 
scale) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Regions 
East -0.009 0.004
(0.03) (0.03)
West 0.020 0.003 0.051 0.080
(0.029) (0.03) (0.094) (0.328)
Central -0.033 -0.052
(0.051) (0.132)
Nyanza 0.046 0.102
(0.08) (0.323)
Survey year 
2003/2004 -0.038 -0.072 -0.006* 0.008 
(0.048) (0.120) (0.03) (0.03) 
2005 -0.042 -0.020
(0.049) (0.041)
2009 0.031 -0.033
(0.03) (0.037)
Observations 2,588 2,588 1,258 1,258 
Average marginal effect results. The estimation employs the Mundlak Chamberlin device which entails 
including time averages of all time varying covariates (not shown). Additional controls include house head’s 
age, years of schooling, and gender, Total value of assets, indicator of adult dead within 2 years of survey, 
indicator of land document ownership, log of distance in km from each community to the nearest market and 
nearest district town, community level 5 year cumulative average of rainfall. Reference region for Uganda is 
Central while Rift Valley is the reference for Kenya. Reference year for Uganda is 2015 while it is 2007 for 
Kenya. Region and year interactions are also included. Clustered robust standard errors shown in parenthesis 
are bootstrapped at 250 replications to account for the generated regressor (farming ability). 
*p<0.10.**p<0.05. and ***p<0.01  
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Appendix 
Appendix Table 1: Determinants of Land Market Participation (Tobit estimation) 
    Kenya   Uganda 
Land rented 
In(ha) 
Land 
rented 
out(ha) 
Land 
rented 
In(ha) 
Land 
rented 
out(ha) 
Land 
Borrowed 
In(ha) 
Land 
borrowed 
out(ha) 
Farming Ability 0.071*** -0.061*  0.022*** 0.005 0.006* 0.004 
(0.023) (0.032) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Log of land owned -0.102*** 0.164* -0.037***   0.005 -0.045*** 0.015** 
     (0.04) (0.096) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
Household size 0.006 -0.0124 0.008** 0.001 0.001 -0.002* 
(adult equivalent 
scale) (0.007) (0.009)  (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Regions 
East 0.129*** 0.071*** -0.009 0.012 
   (0.035) (0.02) (0.011) (0.013) 
West -0.220*** 0.158 0.155*** 0.077*** -0.019 0.001 
(0.069) (0.142) (0.037) (0.02) (0.013) (0.016) 
Central -0.0864** -0.0657* 
(0.042) (0.063) 
Nyanza -0.147** 0.0924 
(0.065) (0.114) 
Survey year 
2009 -0.057 -0.054 -0.071*** -0.004 
(0.042) (0.162) (0.017) (0.017) 
2012 0.0048 -0.014 0.021 -0.025    -0.003 -0.012 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.035) (0.122) (0.013) (0.017) 
2015 0.022 -0.015 -0.041*** -0.056*** 
(0.036) (0.089) (0.015) (0.021) 
         Observations 1,258 1,258   2,588 2,588 2,588 2,588 
Note: Average marginal effects shown in table. Estimation employs the Mundlak Chamberlin device which entails 
including time averages of all time varying covariates (not shown). Additional controls include house head’s age, years 
of schooling, and gender, Total value of assets, indicator of adult dead within 2 years of survey, indicator of land 
document ownership, log of distance in km from each community to the nearest market and nearest district town, 
community level 5 year cumulative average of rainfall. Reference region for Uganda is Central while Rift Valley is the 
reference for Kenya. Reference year for Uganda is 2005 while it is 2007 for Kenya. Region and year interactions are also 
included. Clustered robust standard errors shown in parenthesis are bootstrapped at 250 replications to account for the 
generated regressor (farming ability).*p<0.10.**p<0.05. and ***p<0.01. 2004 is not used in estimation for Uganda since 
information on land rented out was not asked in 2004 survey. 
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Appendix Table 2: Land Market Participation and Household Welfare(Tobit analysis) 
Uganda Kenya 
Value of 
Crop 
Production 
USD 
Crop 
Income 
USD 
Off 
farm 
Income  
USD 
Total 
House hold 
Income 
USD 
Probability 
of Poverty 
(Probit) 
Value of 
Crop 
Production 
USD 
Crop 
Income 
USD 
Off 
farm 
Income 
USD  
Total 
House 
hold 
Income 
USD 
Probability 
of Poverty 
(Probit) 
Net Rented Land(ha) 203.622*** 157.573** -33.394 236.153*** -0.012 121.1*** 96.99*** 4.31 105.8 -0.038* 
(71.189) (69.496) (44.089) (90.863) (0.032) (25.19) (25.98) (80.98) (95.3) (0.022) 
Net borrowed in  246.918** 230.599** 70.367 367.479*** -0.029 
land (ha) (109.26) (106.333) (67.618) (139.343) (0.05) 
Log of land owned  124.755** 103.305** 32.035 126.235** -0.126*** 115.6 71.42 342.3 494.7 -0.068 
(49.591) (48.302) (31.198) (63.273) (0.03) (83.4) (71.78) (278.3) (318.9) (0.07) 
Household size 30.995* 26.837* 4.143 44.202** 0.106*** 34.09** 34.33** 13.22 64.84 0.033*** 
(adult equivalent scale) (16.281) (15.786) (8.214) (20.698) (0.007) (15.82) (15.51) (60.73) (70.59)    (0.014) 
Number of House hold 2,588 2,588 2,588 2,588 2,588 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 1,257 
Average marginal effect results. The estimation employs the Mundlak Chamberlin device which entails including time averages of all time varying covariates 
(not shown). Additional controls include house head’s age, years of schooling, and gender, Total value of assets, indicator of adult dead within 2 years of survey, 
indicator of land document ownership, log of distance in km from each community to the nearest market and nearest district town, community level 5 year 
cumulative average of rainfall. Reference region for Uganda is Central while Rift Valley is the reference for Kenya. Reference year for Uganda is 2015 while it is 
2007 for Kenya. Region and year interactions are also included. Clustered robust standard errors shown in parenthesis. *p<0.10.**p<0.05. and ***p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 3: Land holding and Migration 
  Uganda Kenya 
1 if migrant 
household 
Ols 
Number of 
migrants 
Tobit(Av marginal 
effects) 
1 if migrant 
household 
Ols 
Number of 
migrants 
Tobit(Av 
marginal effect 
Farming Ability 0.014 0.051* -0.042*** -0.114* 
(0.012) (0.08) (0.016) (0.062) 
Log of land owned 0.004 0.047 0.054 0.161 
(0.021) (0.05) (0.057) (0.114) 
Household size -0.024*** -0.068*** -0.09*** -0.194*** 
(adult equivalent 
scale)      (0.006) (0.013) (0.012) (0.021) 
Regions 
East -0.110*** -0.394*** -0.03 
        (0.038) (0.128) (0.02) 
West -0.006 -0.052 0.256*** 0.452** 
(0.048) (0.671) (0.06) (0.183) 
Central 0.104* 0.210* 
      (0.052) (0.11) 
Nyanza        0.125 -0.07 
      (0.086) (0.16) 
Survey year 
2009 0.138*** 0.386*** 
     (0.048) (0.119) 
2012 0.298*** 0.700*** -0.033 -0.125 
     (0.053) (0.121) (0.038) (0.105) 
2015 0.324*** 0.797*** 
     (0.056) (0.106) 
R-square 0.176 0.058 0.108 0.064 
Observations 2,588 2,588  1,258 1,258 
Note: Estimation employs the Mundlak Chamberlin device which entails including time averages of 
all time varying covariates (not shown) Additional controls include house head’s age, years of 
schooling, and gender, Total value of assets, indicator of adult dead within 2 years of survey, 
indicator of land document ownership, log of distance in km from each community to the nearest 
market and nearest district town, community level 5 year cumulative average of rainfall. Reference 
region for Uganda is Central while Rift Valley is the reference for Kenya. Reference year for Uganda 
is 2005 while it is 2007 for Kenya. Region and year interactions are also included. Clustered robust 
standard errors shown in parenthesis are bootstrapped at 250 replications to account for the generated 
regressor (farming ability).*p<0.10.**p<0.05. and ***p<0.01. 2003 and 2004 surveys for Uganda 
and Kenya respectively are not used in the estimation. 
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Appendix Table 4:  Probability model of remaining in the next round of panel survey
Panel Periods(Uganda) Panel Period Kenya
2003-2005 2005-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015 2004-2007 2007-2012
OLS OLS
1 if Head is male 0.011 0.048 0.068** 0.016 -0.025 -0.038
(0.022) (0.045) (0.033) (0.024) (0.034) (0.030)
Heads years of schooling -0.001 -0.009* 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Heads age in years -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.001* -0.003** -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household size 0.001 0.000 -0.004** -0.004* -0.011*** -0.008**
(adult equivalent scale) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Log value of total assets -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log of land holding -0.000 0.001*** 0.001 -0.001 0.005 -0.005**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
1 if Rented In land -0.050*** -0.005** 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.017
(0.018) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.036) (0.031)
share of crop income 0.006 -0.120** -0.053 -0.022 0.004 -0.085**
(0.024) (0.049) (0.035) (0.035) (0.045) (0.042)
Constant 0.281** 0.312** 0.221*** 0.212* 0.400*** 0.269***
(0.143) (0.147) (0.053) (0.121) (0.142) (0.076)
Observations 940 892 908 896 899 713
R-squared 0.160 0.140 0.023 0.205 0.464 0.018
Note: Village dummies are included but not shown.  Robust community clustered SE are reported in 
parenthesis. P***<0.01. P**<0.05 and P*<0.1 
